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ABSTRACT 
Improving livelihoods in rural areas is important to progress of the developing world and it helps in 
the creation of the domestic demand for the productive sector. Private sector partnerships in rural 
areas have been the major driver to reduction of market uncertainties and management of risk and 
thus bring development, these partnerships are done through private loans and contract farming in 
Zimbabwe. The major question however is do these partnerships increase rural household welfare in 
Zimbabwe or it is clearly a capitalist method of rural labour exploitation. Using Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) method for rural communities in Chiredzi and Masvingo rural in Zimbabwe we found 
out that individual households that participates in contract farming and private loans have increased 
welfare gains than those that do not participate. 
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As part of their effort to solve market fail-
ures  that  include  information  asymmetry  and 
missing markets the private sector in Zimbabwe 
have devised a number of strategies in rural eco-
nomic  systems  that  include  contract  farming, 
business  loans  and  infrastructural  development. 
Contract  farming  is  the  most  prevalent  private 
sector partnership strategy in rural areas; it is de-
fined as a situation when a processing firm dele-
gates its production of agricultural commodities 
to growers. 
The  private  sector  market  mechanisms  are 
viewed as a means of improving the household 
welfare in developing countries but in Zimbabwe 
it has been a subject of debate with some quarters 
arguing that it is a means of private sector profit-
eering  and  rural  labour  exploitation  whilst  the 
private sector view it as a means of rural empo-
werment and a means of improving rural devel-
opment, creating markets and bringing economic 
growth to the developing world. 
Improving livelihoods in rural areas is im-
portant to progress of the developing world and it 
helps in the creation of the domestic demand for 
the productive sector. Private sector partnerships 
in rural areas have been the major driver to re-
duction of market uncertainties and management 
of risk and thus bring development, these part-
nerships are done through private loans and con-
tract farming in Zimbabwe. The major question 
however  is  do these  partnerships increase  rural 
household welfare in Zimbabwe or it is clearly a 
capitalist method of rural labour exploitation. The 
PSM methodology will help in giving the conclu-
sions in the Zimbabwean case given the similari-
ties of the rural households. 
A number of authors have written on opera-
tion of contract farming in developing countries, 
Musara (2011) sought to determine the determi-
nants of contract farming in small holder cotton 
producers in Zimbabwe but there have been no 
in-depth study on the effects of such private sec-
tor  market  activities  in  individual  household’s 
welfare. 
Groch (1994) concluded that contract farm-
ing increases welfare since it solves market fail-
ures in the Agricultural sector but however Watt 
(1994) view it as a means of labour exploitation 
by the capitalist industry thus this study seeks to 
extent this debate to the Zimbabwean economy 
looking at the welfare impacts of the institution 
on households that choose to participate in pri-
vate sector contracts on the basis of the general 
thinking  that  contract  farming  increases  house-Russian Journal of Agricultural and Socio-Economic Sciences, No. 10 (10) / 2012 
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hold  welfare  because  individual  rationality  dic-
tates that if it does not increase welfare house-
holds will stop participating in the arrangement. 
Bellemare  (2010)  using  the  data  of  Mada-
gascar did a study on the welfare impacts of con-
tract farming using several household indicators 
including income, income per capita, income per 
adult  equivalent,  income  net  of  revenues  and 
whether  the  household  have  received  a  loan  in 
the past year. The study also used indirect impact 
of participating in contract farming on welfare by 
testing  whether  the  household  that  participated 
have  comparatively  less  volatile  income  meas-
ures. Extending this study to Zimbabwe and in-
cluding  more  variables  will  help  in  the  clear 
analysis of the effect of these private sector pro-
grammes on welfare in Southern Africa. 
In order to measure the welfare gains on the 
households that participate on private sector pro-
grammes that include contract farming and pri-
vate loans we compare them with their counter-
factuals  who  do  not  participate  to  see  welfare 
gains. There is still a big and growing debate on 
how  to  find  the  instrumental  variable  (IV)  to 
identify  the  impact  of  participation  on  welfare 
gains that is a variable that explains participation 
but which is exogenous to household welfare to 
reduce the bias in measurement of welfare gains 
or loss due to participation. 
Our  study  will  adopt  the  propensity  score 
matching  by  (Maertens,  Swinnen,  2009)  where 
there is the treatment and control groups and their 
difference that is the household that participates 
and the one that does not can be accounted on the 
basis of observables (Deheja and Wahba 2002). 
This method is most suitable for the Zimbabwean 
rural  sector  since  most  of  the  rural  households 
have  a  number  of  similarities  on  farm  sizes, 
whether conditions and economic opportunities. 
The  rural  private  sector  includes  a  whole 
continuum  of  economic  agents,  ranging  from 
subsistence or smallholder farmers, rural wage-
earners, livestock herders, small-scale traders and 
micro entrepreneurs; to medium-sized, local pri-
vate operators such as input suppliers, microfin-
ance  institutions,  transporters,  agro  processors, 
commodity brokers and traders; to other, bigger 
market players that may or may not reside in ru-
ral  areas,  including  local  or  international  com-
modity buyers and sellers, multinational seed or 
fertilizer  companies, commercial  banks, agribu-
siness  firms  and  supermarkets.  Associations  of 
farmers, herders, water users or traders also con-
stitute an important part of the private sector. 
In rural economies, different private agents 
face different types of economic constraints that 
limit  their  potential  for  growth.  Some  of  these 
constraints  are  intrinsic  and  include  lack  of 
access to knowledge and skills, while others are 
due  to  the  external  environment  in  which  they 
operate (for example, an inappropriate policy and 
institutional  framework,  or  inadequate  rural 
transport infrastructure). 
In either case, the constraints are such that 
rural economies are often perceived by many pri-
vate-sector players as too costly and risky an op-
tion for investment. Typically, small farmers (to 
varying degrees and depending on the country) 
face constraints such as lack of technical, busi-
ness or marketing skills; poor access to technolo-
gy,  financial  services,  and  social  and  physical 
infrastructure  (e.g.  schools,  training  centres, 
health clinics, roads and markets); and low ca-
pacity  to  influence  government  policies.  As  a 
result,  they  are  often  unable  to  increase  their 
productivity  or  produce  a  market  surplus  with 
which they can improve their cash income. Or if 
they are able to produce a surplus, they often lack 
the necessary information or skills to market it 
effectively and profitably. 
While the number of workers in agriculture, 
including  the  self-employed,  has  stagnated  in 
large parts of the world, the number of rural resi-
dents becoming non-farm  rural employees con-
tinues  to  increase.  Non-farm  rural  employment 
and  self-employment  are  of  particular  signific-
ance to rural women and youth. 
Agribusiness companies, too, may have an 
inadequate understanding of the rural population 
as a market for their services or as potential sup-
pliers  of  produce.  Where  they  do  have  rural 
clients,  they  may  face  high  transaction  costs. 
These  include  not  only  those  costs  associated 
with large numbers of dispersed small producers, 
but also those derived from a poor institutional, 
regulatory and policy environment. For example, 
legislation  on  market  conduct  is  often  lacking, 
contracts are not enforced, and information about 
the trustworthiness of small clients is not availa-
ble. This means that investing in rural areas, and 
in  particular  contracting  with  small  farmers  or 
other rural dwellers, is often seen as too risky. 
Due  to  the  level  of  risk  in  rural  business 
most private partnerships are in the agricultural 
sector which is highly supported by the govern-S. MUNONGO, Great Zimbabwe University 
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ment, private sector and NGOs Musara (2011). 
The main argument behind the vast support ex-
tended to agriculture in Zimbabwe is to improve 
welfare and reduce poverty in the economy. 
Rukuni (2006) concluded that Agriculture is 
the  cornerstone  of  the  Zimbabwean  economy 
contributing towards GDP and total export earn-
ings  and  forming  important  linkages  with  the 
manufacturing sector. They concluded that 60% 
of the economically active population depends on 
agriculture on food and employment. 
Contract  farming  has  been  a  vibrant  ar-
rangement in the past decade due to reduced gov-
ernment funding towards small scale farmers due 
to funds constraints. It has been seen as a signifi-
cant measure that can revive the agricultural sec-
tor in Zimbabwe in high value crops such as cot-
ton,  paprika  and  tobacco  where  returns  to  in-
vestment  are  high  (Rukuni,  2006).  Esterhuizen 
(2004) asserted that cotton from communal far-
mers  contribute  70% of the  national  yield thus 
the communal farmers have been a target of con-
tractors  who  provide  them  with  inputs  such  as 
chemicals,  seed,  fertilizer  and  loans  for  labour 
payment. 
Contract  farming  in  Zimbabwe  though 
viewed by some as not giving an advantage to 
farmers (Mugwagwa, 2005), it have been argued 
that contract farming ensures guaranteed markets 
to farmers which is an important factor in farm-
ing and in some instances it reduces the transport 
costs  to  farmers  as  the  contractor  collects  the 
products from the farmer. In some instances con-
tract farming has reduced viability due to a num-
ber of problems that it faces such as breach of 
contract  due  to  side  marketing,  inadequate 
finance, poor quality produce and unfavourable 
producer prices from contractors. 
Contract farming has expanded particularly 
in  countries  that  have  liberalized  their  markets 
through closing down marketing boards (Rukuni, 
2006) concluded that contract farming has poten-
tial in Zimbabwe where small holder agriculture 
is widespread. The contract farming is usable by 
both the contractor and the farmer to mitigate risk 
(Makhura, Coertzee, Good, 1996). 
Wooded (2003) acknowledged that contract 
farming  has  received  increased  attention  as  an 
institutional  approach  to  commercialisation  of 
smallholder agriculture to improve incomes and 
rural livelihoods and private sector led agricul-
ture in Zimbabwe.  
Cotton and tobacco are capital and labour in-
tensive and improved production of these crops is 
based on the ability of the firm to finance farmers 
throughout the season since few households can 
afford the field work (Rukuni, 2006). 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Estimation of the welfare gain of adoption of 
household participation in private sector partner-
ships based on non experimental observations is 
not  trivial  because  of  the  need  of  finding  on 
counterfactual  of  intervention.  We  cannot  ob-
serve the welfare outcome for those farmers who 
participated had they not participated. However, 
household  participation  is  not  randomly  distri-
buted to the two groups of the households (parti-
cipators  and  non-participators),  but  rather  the 
households themselves deciding to participate or 
not to participate based on the information they 
have.  Therefore,  participators  and  non-
participators may be systematically different. 
Following  the  leads  of  Asfaw  (2010)  two 
proxies  are  used  to  measure  household  welfare 
outcome in this paper, namely crop income and 
household  consumption  expenditure.  Thus  we 
estimate two welfare outcome functions for parti-
cipators  and  another  for  non-participators.  The 
study  will  employ  non-parametric  techniques, 
namely  propensity  score  matching  (PSM),  to 
overcome the econometric problems and assess 
the robustness of our results. 
Browyn and Moffioli (2005) noted that this 
provides a rigorous strategy of identifying statis-
tically robust control groups of non-participants. 
Though the ideal evaluation of a program neces-
sitates  the  creation  of  a  treatment  or  control 
group it cannot be applied before the introduction 
of the program. 
Propensity  Score  Matching  (PSM)  as  first 
propounded by Rosebaum and Rubin (1983) is a 
method that is used to measure the impact of a 
program  on  the  outcome  of  interest.  PSM  is  a 
method used to reduce selection bias in the esti-
mation of treatment or program effects with ob-
servational  data  sets.  The  methodology  devel-
oped is used to assess a counterfactual in a given 
set of observational data just like in any scientific 
experiment where the same sample can be used 
to assess the impact on the outcome if the treat-
ment was not administered. 
The effect of treatment evaluation on policy 
formulations is direct because if an intervention Russian Journal of Agricultural and Socio-Economic Sciences, No. 10 (10) / 2012 
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is successful it can be linked to desirable social 
programs or improvements in existing programs 
through  review.  The  aim  of  adopting  such  a 
process is to enable policy makers attain the ob-
jective or goal of intervention. According to Kas-
sie  (2010)  the  standard  problem  of  treatment 
evaluation involves the inference of a causal con-
nection between treatment and the intended out-
come. Thus given a program we observe that: 
 
) 1 ......( .......... .......... .......... ,........ 1 ) , , ( N i D X Y i i i =  
 
Where the dependent variable or outcome of 
interest is  i Y ,  i X  is a vector of independent va-
riables  and  i D   is  a  binary  variable  indicating 
whether the individual household is a participator 
or not. 
 
) 2 ..( .......... .......... {
1
0
ipates holdpartic ifthehouse
otherwise i D
=
= =
 
 
It is the impact of a hypothetical change of 
Di on Yi, holding the vector Xi constant, that is of 
interest. In this case the outcome Yi is compared 
to the treatment and non-treatment states. Since 
no  individual  household  is  simultaneously  ob-
served in both states we cannot use the ones who 
did  not  receive  the  treatment  in  the  sample  as 
counterfactuals.  The  situation  becomes  that  of 
missing data set. The method of causal inference 
can  be  tackled  by  creating  a  counterfactual. 
Therefore the question we tackle when applying 
PSM is to assess how the outcome of an average 
untreated individual household would change if 
such a household did not participate. 
The idea of measuring the effects of adop-
tion or treatment requires constructing a measure 
that compares the average incomes of the treated 
and  non-treated  groups.  Rosebaum  and  Rubin 
(1983) define a propensity score as a condition 
probability  of  receiving  a  treatment  given  pre-
treatment  characteristics. They  show  that if  the 
exposure to treatment or adoption of technology 
is random within the cells defined by the values 
of the propensity score. Therefore given a popu-
lation or sample of units the propensity score or 
the  conditional  probability  of  receiving  a  treat-
ment given Xi is: 
 
( ) [ ] [ ] ) 3 ..( .......... / / 1 Pr x D E x D x p = = =  
Once propensity scores are known  we then 
can calculate the average effect of treatment on the 
treated (ATT) as follows: 
 
[ ] 1 / 0 1 = − = i i i D Y Y E AAT ( ) [ ] ( ) x p D Y Y E E i i i , 1 / 0 1 = − = ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ) 4 .....( 1 / , 0 / , 1 / 0 1 = = − = = i i i i D x p D Y E x p D Y E E  
 
In equation 4  i Y1  assumes if the household 
adopted new technology  i Y0  is a counterfactual if 
the same household did not adopt technology. The 
hypothesis  requires  two  assumptions:  the  condi-
tional independence assumption and the assump-
tion of unconfoundedness. 
The first assumption states that conditional on 
i X  the outcomes are independent of treatment. In 
other words, participation does not depend on the 
outcome. 
Mathematically the representation states that 
the intervention outcomes are orthogonal of treat-
ment conditional on the covariates given as fol-
lows: 
 
) 5 .........( .......... .......... / , 1 , 0 X D Y Y ⊥  
 
The unconfoundedness assumption, which in 
some cases is referred to as balancing condition 
is necessary if we are to identify some population 
measures of impact (Rosenbaum, Rubin, 1983), 
given the overlap or matching assumption in 3 
the assumption in 5 ensures that for each of the 
vector  i X ,  there  exist  both  treated  and  non-
treated cases. The propensity score measure can 
be computed given the data  ( ) i i X D , through a 
logistic regression. 
Our  i X  shows the selection criteria: Educa-
tional  background  of  household  head;  Income; 
Closeness to the chief’s compound; Gender and 
age  of  household  head;  Total  area  of  land  uti-
lised; Whether the land is under irrigation. 
Thus for the unconfoundedness assumption 
it states that given the propensity score: 
 
( ) ) 6 ........( .......... .......... / x p X D ⊥  
 
Equation  6  states  that  for  individuals  with 
the same propensity score, the adoption of tech-
nology  is  orthogonal  or  random,  thus  with  the S. MUNONGO, Great Zimbabwe University 
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balancing  condition,  the  conditional  indepen-
dence  assumption  given  X  implies  conditional 
independence given ( ) x p : 
 
( ) x p D Y Y X D Y Y / , / , 1 0 1 0 ⊥ ⇒ ⊥  
 
Based on the above set of assumptions the 
PSM technique employs predicted probability of 
group membership that is treatment versus non-
treatment  group  based  on  observed  predictors 
usually  obtained  from  a  logistic  regression  to 
create a counterfactual group. 
Using  calculated  propensity  scores  as  de-
fined  in  3  is  not  enough  to  estimate  average 
treatment effects of an intervention (Dehejia et al 
2002). The reason is that the propensity score is 
usually a continuous variable and the probability 
of observing two units with the same propensity 
score is in principle not possible. 
The propensity score allows the identifica-
tion of farmers of similar covariates. The main 
purpose  of  propensity  score  is,  given  a  treated 
farmer, to find an untreated farmer with similar 
characteristics. Accordingly, the difference in the 
outcome variable will be attributed to the treat-
ment, and is denoted the average treatment effect. 
There  are  obviously  some  contentious  issues, 
mainly  the  overlap  and  the  unconfoundedness 
assumptions. 
 
SURVEY DESIGN, DATA AND RESULTS 
 
The data used for this study is from a prima-
ry data collection in two districts of Masvingo. 
These districts are Chiredzi and Masvingo rural 
communities which have similar weather condi-
tions. During this survey, discussions were held 
with  different  stakeholders  including  farmers, 
traders and extension staff working directly with 
farmers.  We  did  a  random  sampling  of  315 
households from  each  district  and  516  families 
responded to the questionnaire. 
The  survey  collected  valuable  information 
on several factors including household composi-
tion and characteristics, land and non-land farm 
assets, livestock ownership, household member-
ship in different rural institutions, varieties and 
area planted, costs of production, yield data for 
different crop types, indicators of access to infra-
structure and irrigation facilities, household mar-
ket participation, household income sources, ma-
jor consumption expenses and private partnership 
participation (whether the household received a 
loan or is into contract farming). 
Table 1 below shows descriptive statistics of 
the respondents, the data shows that 50% of the 
households are on contract farming and 21% re-
ceived loans while 29% did not participate in pri-
vate partnerships’ in the season 2010/2011. 
From  table  1  the  survey  also  showed  that 
those  who  entered  into  contract  farming  or  re-
ceived private loans on average had better educa-
tional background, were closer to the market and 
had agricultural extension services close to their 
farming plots. These finding are because firstly 
those who are educated have better knowledge on 
the importance of adequate funding in agricultur-
al production. Secondly those close to extension 
services get encouragement to increase their pro-
duction. 
 
Table 1 – Description, units, and statistics for variables included in the study 
 
Variable  Participators 
(N=366) 
Non-participators 
(N=150) 
Average net crop income (in USD)  3452  1243 
Total household income (in USD)  1263432  186450 
Average distance to village market (in km)  2.8  5.7 
Distance to extension services (in km)  3.7  5.1 
Average household head age (in years)  36  54 
Average household head education (in years of schooling)  11  6 
Average income from off-farm activities (in USD)  239  451 
Access to irrigation  243  34 
 
The logit estimates of the participators pro-
pensity  equation  are  presented  in  Table  2.  The 
logit model has a McFadden pseudo 
2 R  value of 
0.192 and correctly predicts 76 percent of adop-
ters and 56 percent of non-adopters. Most of the 
variables are statistically significantly associated 
with participation in private sector partnerships. 
Farm  size,  occupation,  and  education  are  posi-
tively associated with adoption. Russian Journal of Agricultural and Socio-Economic Sciences, No. 10 (10) / 2012 
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Table 2 – Logit estimates of the propensity to adopt agricultural technology 
 
Variables  Coefficient  Robust std. error 
Ln (farm size)  0.432***  -0.075 
Ln (distance to village market)  -0.31***  -0.076 
Distance to main market  -0.34**  -0.084 
Distance to extension worker  -0.46***  -0.085 
Age  -0.044**  -0.157 
Education  0.80***  -0.089 
Off-farm income  -0.009  0.015 
Constant  -3.666***  -0.694 
Summary statistics 
Pseudo R-squared  0.192 
Model chi-square  185.16 
Log likelihood ratio  -413.6856 
Non-adopters correctly predicted  56% 
Adopters correctly predicted  76% 
Number of observations  516 
 
After  estimating  the  propensity  scores  for 
participators  and  non-participators  groups  we 
check  the  common  support  condition.  We  find 
that  there  is  considerable  overlap  in  common 
support. Based on Table 2, among adopters, the 
predicted propensity score ranges from 0.339 to 
0.999, with a mean of 0.669, while among non-
participators, it ranges from 0.0129 to 0.898, with 
a mean of 0.455. Thus, the common support as-
sumption  is  satisfied  in  the  region  of  [0.0129, 
0.999], with only a loss of 18 (0.035 percent) ob-
servations from adopters. 
The pseudo-
2 R  is 19, 2%. This low pseudo-
2 R   suggests  that  the  proposed  specification  of 
the propensity score is fairly successful in terms 
of  balancing  the  distribution  of  covariates  be-
tween the two groups. 
 
Table 3 – Impact of adoption on crop income and consumption expenditure and 
Rosenbaum sensitivity analysis results 
 
 
NNM
1 = single nearest neighbour matching with replacement, common support, and calliper (0.06). 
NNM
2 = five nearest neighbour matching with replacement, common support, and calliper (0.06). 
KBM= kernel based matching with band width 0.06, common support, and calliper (0.06). 
Note: ***, **, * is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 3 reports the estimates of the average 
participation effects estimated by NNM and KBM 
methods.  As  a  sensitivity  analysis,  the  table  re-
ports estimates based on the single and five nearest 
neighbours, and kernel estimator with one band-
widths. All the analyses were based on implemen-
tation of common support and calliper, so that the 
distributions of participators and non-participators 
were located in the same domain. As suggested by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), we used a calliper 
size of one-quarter of the standard deviation of the 
propensity scores. 
The outcome variables are the net value of 
crop income per hectare and consumption expend-
Matching Algorithms  Outcomes 
Mean outcome variables 
ATT (USD)  Participator  Non-participator 
NNM
1 
Crop income  886  543  354 
(3.11)*** 
Consumption expenditure  748  198  311 
(3.14)*** 
NNM
2 
Crop income  895  343  440 
(4.11)*** 
Consumption expenditure  1687  1101  456 
(3.14)*** 
KBM 
Crop income  2969  1453  1433 
(3.21)*** 
Consumption expenditure  1437  999  546 
(2.14)*** S. MUNONGO, Great Zimbabwe University 
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iture. Although the two matching algorithms based 
on the logit model produced different quantitative 
results,  the  qualitative  findings  are  similar.  The 
results indicate that participation in contract farm-
ing and private loans have a positive and signifi-
cant effect on crop income and consumption ex-
penditure. 
The  increase  in  crop  income  ranges  from 
USD 886 to USD 2969 per hectare. This is the 
average difference in crop income of similar pairs 
of households that belong to different status (parti-
cipators  and  non-participators).  The  increase  in 
crop income helps adopters to increase their con-
sumption expenditure and thus improve welfare. 
Participation  has  impact  on  increasing  the 
consumption expenditure with both matching al-
gorithms  techniques  showing  that  participators 
have  higher  average  consumption  expenditures. 
The results show that adoption of technology in-
creases  income  and  consumption  expenditure  to 
households thus increasing welfare and reducing 
poverty. 
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